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At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the defining tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and conflict resolution—despite the fact that this squares with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This change is significant, but observers caution it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Selective Intervention

A similar confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.